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The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), also known
as the Simpson-Rodino Act,' is the most significant piece of immigration
legislation in over thirty years. It radically revamps this already compli-
cated area of law. Its impact on employers is particularly great, and can
be seen in three ways. First, fines of up to $10,000 and even jail sentences
can be imposed on businesses that knowingly hire undocumented aliens.
Second, every employer must now verify and maintain records on the
immigration and citizenship status of each prospective employee, even if
the applicant is a U.S. citizen. Third, antidiscrimination provisions pro-
hibit all but the smallest employers from discriminating in hiring or firing
on the basis of an individual's national origin or citizenship status. Persons
who feel they have been discriminated against may initiate an action
against the employer.
These provisions create major new responsibilities for businesses, and
in effect deputize them as junior immigration inspectors. Employers must
now provide the sort of enforcement check that the woefully undermanned
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is unable to perform. Law-
yers will feel these duties and prohibitions doubly: first in advising their
*Mr. Roberts and Mr. Yale-Loehr are Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of In-
terpreter Releases, a weekly periodical based in Washington, D.C., that reports and analyzes
developments in immigration law. Mr. Roberts supervised immigration litigation at the De-
partment of Justice for a number of years and then served as Chairman of the Board of
Immigration Appeals from 1968 to 1974. Mr. Yale-Loehr practiced corporate immigration
law for several years with a major Washington, D.C., law firm before joining Interpreter
Releases.
I. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (10A).
1014 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
business clients, and second in having to comply themselves, in their own
role as employers.
This article analyzes the employer sanctions and antidiscrimination
provisions of the Simpson-Rodino Act. The article points out ambiguities,
gaps, and unanswered questions in the statute and supplementing regu-




The Simpson-Rodino Act for the first time imposes civil and criminal
penalties on employers who knowingly hire, recruit, or refer aliens who
are not authorized to work. Employers may lawfully continue to employ
unauthorized aliens hired before November 6, 1986, however. The sanc-
tions apply to all employers, no matter how small. The civil fines range
from $250 to $10,000 per alien; criminal penalties and injunctive relief are
possible for habitual violators. A separate provision penalizes everyone
who fails to keep certain records concerning their hiring, recruiting, or
referring practices, even if they hire only U.S. citizens. These paperwork
penalties range from $100 to $1,000 per applicant.
Under the statute employer sanctions were to take effect June 1, 1987.
The INS administratively delayed enforcement, however, for three months,
until September 1, 1987. Until May 31, 1988, only warning citations will
be issued for first violations.
B. SCOPE OF SANCTIONS
Generally. The new law creates a new section 274A of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). 2 Section 274A sets forth two separate types
of sanctions. First, it makes it unlawful for an individual or company to
hire, recruit, or refer an alien for a fee after November 6, 1986 if the
employer knows the alien is unauthorized to work. 3 This prohibition also
applies to continuing employment of aliens hired after the date of enact-
ment who originally were authorized to work but who subsequently be-
came unauthorized. 4 Second, the new section also prohibits an individual
or company from hiring, recruiting or referring any individual-alien or
2. Id. § 101(a) (enacting Immigration and Nationality Act § 274A) [hereinafter new INA
§ I.
3. New INA § 274A(a)(1).
4. New INA § 274A(a)(1).
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U.S. citizen-without first examining certain documents establishing the
applicant's identity and authorization to work.
5
The knowing requirement. The sanctions apply only to "knowing" vi-
olations. 6 This is potentially the most important word in the entire em-
ployers sanctions portion of the new statute. Neither the statute nor the
INS's implementing regulations define "knowing," but presumably the
standard requirement of subjective, actual knowledge, rather than an ob-
jective, "reason to know" test, will apply. Thus, employers and recruiting
and referring agencies should not be subject to sanctions if they have
reason to suspect, but do not actually know, that the alien is not authorized
to work.
In some cases employers, recruiters, or referrers may have reservations
about an alien's authorization to work, based on statements or additional
documentation volunteered by the applicant. As long as the employer,
recruiter, or referrer complies in good faith with the verification proce-
dures of the new Act, however, they should be protected. 7 Moreover, the
statute expressly states that an employer or other entity does not have to
ask for other documentation besides that required by the law. 8 The ver-
ification procedures are discussed in greater detail below.
"Unauthorized alien." The sanctions apply only to hiring, continuing
to employ, recruiting, or referring an "unauthorized alien." 9 The statute
defines this term to mean (a) an alien not lawfully admitted for permanent
residence or (b) not authorized to work, either through the INA or by the
INS.' 0 This definition should pose no problems for immigration practi-
tioners, who are used to the complexities of work authorization. However,
it will require educating employers and employment agencies. For ex-
ample, an alien who enters the U.S. on an H-1 nonimmigrant visa as a
person of distinguished merit and ability is authorized to work only for
the particular employer for which the H-I visa was approved. If that alien
applies for another job, and presents a valid driver's license and Social
Security card to the second employer, that employer will have no reason
to know that the alien is not authorized to work that second job.
The INS's implementing regulations list twenty-five categories of aliens
who are deemed to have work authorization through their immigration
status.II The list includes lawful permanent resident aliens, temporary
5. New INA § 274A(b).
6. New INA § 274A(a)(I)(A), 274A(a)(2).
7. See new INA § 274A(a)(3) (defense for good faith compliance with § 274A(b)).
8. New INA § 274A(b)(1)(A).
9. New INA § 274A(h)(3).
10. Id.
II. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,226-27 (May I, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a), (b)). The INS
regulations are analyzed and reproduced in 64 Interpreter Releases 517-63 (1987).
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workers in the U.S. on L-I intracompany transferee visas, refugees, asy-
lees, and individuals granted extended voluntary departure status. Fifteen
other categories of aliens have to apply for work authorization, including
spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of principal aliens who have
received certain nonimmigrant visas. 12 Asylum applicants, parolees, sus-
pension of deportation applicants, and individuals granted voluntary de-
parture are also included in this latter category. 13
The INS has also agreed to grant temporary work authorization to
legalization applicants. The Service proposed this policy in its proposed
regulations, 14 but then agreed to begin immediately the work permits as
a partial settlement in a class action challenging various aspects of the
1986 immigration law. 15
Under the terms of the settlement, undocumented aliens seeking em-
ployment may sign a simple declaration that they believe they qualify for
legalization and intend to apply for it. The alien does not have to present
any documentation. This statement authorizes the alien to work. Em-
ployers may then retain this statement as legal protection against employer
sanctions. The self-issuing work permits are valid until September 1, 1987.16
It is anticipated that by that date such aliens will either receive a decision
on their legalization applications or else will receive an extension of their
temporary work authorization.
Small employers, part-time and temporary help, and casual hires. All
employers, no matter how small, are potentially subject to employer sanc-
tions. Thus, for example, a family who knowingly hires an unauthorized
alien as a maid, or an attorney who hires an undocumented alien as a
secretary, theoretically could face a $2,000 fine. Similarly, the definition
of "unauthorized alien" is not limited to full-time employment. Employ-
ers, recruiters, or referrers who deal with unauthorized aliens for part-
time or temporary positions are also potentially subject to sanctions.
The conference report, however, states that Congress expects the INS
"to target its enforcement resources on repeat offenders" and to consider
"the size of the employer."' 17 INS officials have said they will not harass
families hiring household workers. 18 Thus, the longstanding practice of
12. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,227-28 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)).
13. Id.
14. 52 Fed. Reg. 8767 (March 19, 1987) (proposed 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(8)).
15. Catholic Social Services v. Meese, No. CIV-S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal. March 23,
1987), reported in 64 Interpreter Releases 376-77, 437-38, 446-57 (1987). A notice containing
the terms of the settlement appears in 52 Fed. Reg. 11,567-75 (April 9, 1987).
16. See 52 Fed. Reg. 11,568 (April 9, 1987); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221, 16,226 (May
I, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.2(a), 274a. I1).
17. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1986) [hereinafter H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1000].
18. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, at A16, col. I.
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hiring unauthorized aliens as domestic help will probably continue un-
abated. As a practical matter, other persons and entities who hire, recruit,
or refer aliens only for part-time or temporary jobs are also unlikely to
face an INS investigation, unless their violations are flagrant and habitual.
The House Judiciary Committee report on the bill also states that it
does not intend employer sanctions to apply to "casual hires."' 19 The
Committee defined that phrase as a situation where no ongoing employer/
employee relationship exists. 20 Thus, Congress intended that a person
should not be penalized for knowingly hiring an unauthorized alien as a
babysitter, carpenter, or temporary secretary for one job or one day, or
for failing to verify the citizenship status of such an individual.
The INS, however, defines "casual employment" in its regulations
much more restrictively. Under the Service's view, only individuals who
provide "domestic service in a private home that is sporadic, irregular,
or intermittent" qualify as casual hires. 21 Thus, a family who hired a maid
one time to help out at a party would not have to verify the maid's work
authorization or worry about violating the sanctions provisions of the new
law. But the same family who hires a carpenter for one job, or a law firm
who hires a temporary secretary directly for one day, could not claim the
"casual employment" exception. The carpenter's and secretary's work
are both sporadic, but do not involve domestic service. Moreover, the
secretary works outside a private home, an additional reason it would not
be considered "casual." This definition fails to accord with the realities
of the workplace.
Recruiting. Employer sanctions can be imposed on persons or entities
who "hire, . . . recruit or refer for a fee" an unauthorized alien. 22 Em-
ployment agencies and headhunters, who are paid for their recruiting
efforts, clearly fall within the scope of the section. The statute is not as
clear as it could be, however, about whether recruiting without a fee is
also included. For example, suppose a law firm recruits new associates
by conducting interviews on law school campuses. If the firm learns that
an applicant is not authorized to work, continues to recruit him, but
ultimately decides not to hire him, is the firm still potentially liable for
having knowingly recruited an unauthorized alien? This comes within the
literal definition of "recruiting," but it is unlikely that Congress intended
that result. The INS's regulations resolve this potential problem by only
defining "recruit for a fee." 23 This means that recruiting without a fee
19. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 57 (1986) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 682].
20. Id.
21. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(h)).
22. New INA § 274A(a)(l).
23. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(e)).
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does not subject an employer to the verification and sanctions provisions
of the new law. The proposed regulations also clarify that employment
eligibility verification must be done only at the time of hire or referral to
the employer, not before. 24 This should lighten employers' burdens
somewhat.
Another issue resolved by the regulations concerns recruiting or refer-
ring aliens who are out of the U.S. Normally, such aliens are unauthorized
to work, because they do not have a visa to work in the U.S. yet. But
neither generally can they apply for one until a job is offered. Thanks to
the regulations, employment agencies can recruit or refer such aliens
without fear of violating the IRCA, as long as the alien obtains appropriate
work authorization before actually starting to work in the U.S.
Referring for a fee. The House and Senate conferees deleted Senate
language that would have also penalized referring for "other considera-
tion." 25 Elimination of this phrase clarifies that the legislation is not in-
tended to apply to labor unions or other organizations that refer individuals
for employment, but not for a fee or profit motive. 26
"Grandfathered" employees. The new Act specifies that sanctions can
be imposed only for hiring, recruiting, or referring actions that take place
after November 6, 1986, the date of enactment. 27 This "grandfather"
clause means that employers may lawfully continue to employ unauthor-
ized aliens hired before that date. 28 However, it also leaves such workers
in a predicament. Only one employer in the U.S.-their current one-
can employ them without facing possible sanctions. But these workers
are still subject to apprehension in INS raids and subsequent deportation.
It is possible that employers might exploit employees caught in this legal
limbo, knowing there is nowhere else they can legally work.
Continuing employment. The new law prohibits an employer from
knowingly continuing to employ an alien who is or has become unau-
thorized to work. 29 However, this ban does not apply to aliens hired before
the date of enactment. 30 To see how this prohibition may work in the real
world, consider the following hypotheticals. Law firm A hires Alien X as
a messenger in 1985, knowing he is not authorized to work. Law firm A
continues to employ X through 1988. Also in 1985, law firm B hires Alien
24. Id. at 16,222 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(I)(iv)).
25. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 17, at 85.
26. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,218, 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(d),
(e)) (excluding union hiring halls from the definitions of "refer for a fee" and "recruit for
a fee.")
27. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)(3)(A).
28. Id. § 101(a)(3)(B).
29. New INA § 274A(a)(2).
30. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)(3)(B).
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Y as an associate. Unlike Alien X, Alien Y has work authorization at the
time of hire. Alien Y's work authorization expires, however, in 1988.
Employer B continues to employ Alien Y after 1988, knowing about Y's
unauthorized status.
Law firm C hires Alien Z as a secretary in 1987. Alien Z has work
authorization at the time of hiring, but it expires in 1988. Firm C, like law
firm B, continues to employ Alien Z after 1988, knowing about her un-
documented status. Which of the three employers has violated the con-
tinuing employment ban?
Law firm A is clearly free from sanctions, because it hired X before
the date of enactment. Law firm C is clearly subject to sanctions, because
it hired Z after the new law took effect.
It is unclear from the statute itself whether law firm B is subject to
sanctions. On the one hand, the grandfather clause might seem to protect
it, because the firm hired Y before November 6, 1986. On the other hand,
the new law also clearly forbids knowing continuing employment of an
alien who "has become" unauthorized to work. The statute fails to clarify
whether that prohibition extends to aliens hired before the date of en-
actment. Fortunately, the INS's regulations resolve this issue by imposing
the continuing employment ban only on aliens hired after November 6,
1986. 3 1
The IRCA did not address one common problem in this area: what to
do when an alien and his or her employer have applied for an extension
of stay before the expiration date of the alien's original visa, but do not
receive the extension approval in time because of INS processing delays.
Can the alien employee continue to lawfully work in the interim period
until he or she receives the extension approval? Prior INS case law sug-
gested not, raising concerns about the threat of employer sanctions if the
employer continues to employ the alien during this time frame. Fortu-
nately, the Service's implementing regulations resolve this problem by
providing for an automatic extension of employment authorization for 120
days for certain nonimmigrant aliens who have filed timely applications
for extension of stay.32
Use of labor through contract. The new law's provision on the use of
labor through contract might potentially limit the legislation's grandfather
clause benefit for certain current employees. The law states that "a person
31. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.3).
32. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,227, 16,228 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a. 12(b)(15), 274a. 13(d)).
This conforms the regulations to the relevant legislative history, which indicates that sanc-
tions for a continuing employment violation should not apply if the only reason the alien
becomes out of status is because of INS processing delays. H.R. RaP. No. 682, supra note
19, at 57.
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or other entity who uses a contract, subcontract, or exchange, entered
into, renegotiated, or extended after the date of the enactment of this
section" to knowingly obtain the labor of an unauthorized alien shall be
deemed to have violated the IRCA Act. 33 Neither the statute nor the
implementing regulations define the key phrases "contract" and "ex-
change." If interpreted broadly to include oral as well as written agree-
ments, any employee's salary renewal or promotion might trigger a vio-
lation of this section, and thus vitiate the 1986 Act's separate grandfather
clause benefit for current employees. 34 At the very least, the section
clearly applies to written contracts. Employers of certain types of indi-
viduals, such as professional athletes, entertainers, and executives, which
regularly employ aliens through written contracts that are renewed reg-
ularly, will want to consult with counsel about the ramifications of this
provision.
The legislative history indicates that Congress did not focus on the
possible conflict between this section and the grandfather clause, but
rather on the potential for some employers to use subcontractors to at-
tempt to mitigate liability for hiring undocumented aliens. 35 This provision
expressly closes that loophole; general contractors are equally liable with
subcontractors for the knowing employment of unauthorized aliens. 36
Self-employment and independent contractors. The IRCA does not ex-
pressly address self-employment or independent agent situations. For ex-
ample, consider a company that hires an alien as an outside sales agent
after the statute takes effect. Under the agreement with the company, the
alien is paid only a percentage of the sales he or she generates. The alien
receives no company benefits. The company considers the alien to be an
independent contractor, not an employee. If the company knows the alien
is not authorized to work, has it violated the 1986 Act? The provision
governing use of labor through contract, discussed above, may stretch to
cover this issue. Also, the legislative history states that the sanctions
provisions "are not intended to limit in any way the scope of the term
'employee' in Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
as amended, or of the rights and protections stated in Sections 7 and 8
of that Act." 37
The INS's regulations define "indepentient contractor" to include "in-
dividuals or entities who carry on independent business, contract to do
33. New INA § 274A(a)(4); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §
274a.5).
34. Cf. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)(3).
35. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 62.
36. Id.
37. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 58.
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a piece of work according to their own means and methods, and are subject
only as to results." 38 The determination is to be made on a case-by-case
basis. The factors identified in the regulations for determining whether a
particular business arrangement constitutes an agreement with an inde-
pendent contractor are consistent with Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
guidelines.
Those IRS guidelines, however, are stricter than the standards devel-
oped by the National Labor Relations Board. Under the IRS it is not
necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which
the services are performed to find an employer-employee relationship; it
is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. Despite this test,
employers may be tempted to characterize many new hires as independent
contractors in an effort to minimize their exposure under the IRCA.
Defenses. The legislation provides an affirmative defense for employers,
recruiters, or referrers who show "good faith" compliance with the ver-
ification and recordkeeping requirements described later in this article. 39
The House Judiciary Committee report notes that good faith compliance
can be shown by proof of the employer's, recruiter's, or referrer's review
and retention of the verification forms.40 If a person or entity keeps this
paper trail, a rebuttable presumption is established that he or she has
acted in good faith, and the burden shifts to the government to prove
otherwise. 41 The government can rebut the presumption by offering proof
that the documents did not reasonably on their face appear to be genuine,
that the verification process was pretextual, or that the employer, re-
cruiter, or referrer colluded with the employee in falsifying documents. 42
The legislative history also notes that even if the employer does not
seek to establish an affirmative defense, the burden of proving a violation
always remains on the government-by a preponderance of the evidence
in the case of civil penalties, and beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal
prosecutions .43
This affirmative defense does not protect an employer from a continuing
employment violation. Suppose, for example, that after the date of en-
actment an attorney interviews and hires an alien who is authorized to
work. The alien's work authorization expires a year later, and the lawyer,
knowing that fact, continues to employ the alien. The fact that the attorney
properly verified the alien's work authorization at the time of hiring will
38. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(j)).
39. New INA § 274A(a)(3); see infra text accompanying notes 45-82.
40. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 57.
41. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4).
42. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 57.
43. Id.
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not protect him or her from sanctions for continuing to employ the alien
after the authorization has expired. 44
C. VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Generally. To ensure that prospective employees are eligible to work
in the U.S., the new law provides a verification system. The system
involves examining certain types of specified documents to verify two
things: (1) that the applicant is presenting his or her true identity and (2)
that the applicant is eligible to work.45 The employer, recruiter, or referrer
must then sign new INS Form 1-9, attesting under penalty of perjury that
the required documents have been examined. 46 The individual must also
sign the same form, attesting under penalty of perjury that he or she is a
U.S. citizen or national, a lawful permanent resident alien, or an alien
authorized to work. 47 The employer, recruiter, or referrer must retain
these forms for at least three years, and may not dispose of them, in any
event, until one year after the individual's employment ends. 48 These
verification requirements apply to both U.S. and alien applicants.
Types of documents. Certain documents will establish both an individ-
ual's employment authorization and identity. Included in this category
are: (1) a U.S. passport; (2) a certificate of U.S. citizenship or naturaliza-
tion; (3) an unexpired foreign passport, if endorsed to show work au-
thorization; (4) a resident alien registration receipt card (INS Form 1-55 1);
or (5) an unexpired work permit, issued by the INS. 49 The law and reg-
ulations do not require the U.S. passport to be valid.50 Presumably an
expired U.S. passport will be acceptable.
Alternatively, an individual can present one document evidencing em-
ployment authorization-such as a Social Security card or U.S. birth
certificate-and one document establishing identity-such as a driver's
license, school identification card, voter registration card, or draft card.5'
Authenticity of documents. An employer, recruiter, or referrer is deemed
to comply with the verification requirements if the document "reasonably
44. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.3).
45. New INA § 274A(b)(l).
46. Id.
47. New INA § 274A(b)(2).
48. New INA § 274A(b)(3); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,223 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §
274a.2(b)(2)).
49. New INA § 274A(b)(I)(B); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §
274a.2(b)(l)(v)(A)).
50. New INA § 274A(b)(l)(B)(i); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §
274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)(1)).
51. New INA § 274A(b)(I)(C)-(D); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(B-C)).
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appears on its face to be genuine." 52 The legislative history states that
the "reasonable man" standard is to be used in implementing this pro-
vision. 53 Assuming the employer's, recruiter's, or referrer's examination
of the applicant's documentation meets this test, there is no requirement
that an employer request additional documentation or that the applicant
produce additional proof.54 Moreover, the legislative history emphasizes
that "documents that reasonably appear to be genuine should be accepted
by employers without requiring further investigation of those
documents." 55
Recruiting and referring. The verification requirements apply to any
"person or other entity hiring, recruiting, or referring an individual for
employment in the United States." 56 Thus, employment agencies and
other recruiters and referrers clearly have to comply with the verification
requirements, just as employers do. Verification worried recruiters and
referrers greatly. Over 3,100 of the 4,000 comments the INS received on
its proposed employer sanctions regulations concerned this issue. Many
employment agencies complained that they would have to limit their ac-
tivities to a small geographic area if they had to perform face-to-face
verifications. Most recruitment is done over the phone, and the recruiter
or referrer never meets the applicant.
The Service capitulated to the outcry. The final rule granted recruiters
and referrers significantly more leeway in complying with the IRCA than
for other types of businesses. Specifically, unlike other entities, recruiters
and referrers do not have to retroactively verify individuals recruited or
referred during the period between November 6, 1986 and May 31, 1987. 57
Also, recruiters and referrers only have to verify those individuals actually
hired as a result of the referral. 58 Most importantly, recruiters and refer-
rers do not have to verify the person's work eligibility themselves; they
can have others, including the hiring employer, complete the 1-9 form for
them. Liability still ultimately rests, however, with the recruiter or referrer.
Verification by a state employment agency. The verification require-
ments are deemed fulfilled if the individual was referred by a state em-
ployment agency and the referral documentation certifies that the agency
has complied with the new law's verification procedures. 59 The House-
52. New INA § 274A(b)(1)(A).
53. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 62.
54. New INA § 274A(b)(1)(A).
55. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 62.
56. New INA § 274A(b).
57. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)).
58. Id. at 16,222 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(iv)).
59. New INA § 274A(a)(5); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.6)).
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Senate conference report emphasizes that this provision is not intended
to impose any additional affirmative duty on state employment agencies. 60
Given the overworked nature of most such agencies, few may be willing
to provide such certifications.
This benefit to employers does not extend to referrals from private
employment or recruiting agencies. Thus, employers have to comply with
the verification requirements even if the private agency certifies that it
has already done so.
Applicability to "grandfathered" employees. Employers are not re-
quired to verify the status of employees hired before November 6, 1986,
the date of enactment, because the Act only mandates verification for
"hiring, recruiting, or referring," not for continued employment. Such
aliens are known as "grandfathered" employees. The statute does not
accord undocumented "grandfathered" alien employees the right to re-
main in the U.S. It only exempts their employers from penalties for con-
tinuing to employ them. Under the IRS's regulations, an alien employee
loses "grandfathered" status if he or she quits, is fired, or is deported
from the U.S. Temporary leaves, lay-offs, and strikes, however, will not
jeopardize an alien's "grandfathered" status.61
Applicability to new employees. The regulations require employers to
retroactively complete the 1-9 form for individuals hired after November 6,
1986, who were still employed as of May 31, 1987. Employers have until
September 1, 1987, to complete the form for those new hires. Individuals
hired after June 1, 1987, must generally be verified within three business
days. 62
Applicability to Legalization Applicants. The INS has devised a special
interim rule to govern verification of undocumented aliens who plan to
apply for legalization. An employer thinking of hiring such an alien is to
ask the applicant two questions: (1) "Do you claim to qualify for the
legalization provisions of the new immigration law?" and (2) "Do you
intend to apply for legal status and seek interim work authorization from
INS?" 63 If the alien answers yes to both questions, the employer should
note the answers on the 1-9 form. 64 The alien does not have to provide
any further documentation to prove his intent to apply for legalization.
By following this procedure the employer will have complied with the
60. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 17, at 89.
61. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,223-24 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.2(b)(l)(viii), 274a.7(d)).
62. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221-22 (May I, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a), (b)(1)).
63. See 52 Fed. Reg. 11,568 (April 9, 1987).
64. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,226 (May I, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a. 11)). A sample 1-9 form
showing the correct way to complete the form for a legalization applicant is reproduced in
64 Interpreter Releases 487 (1987).
VOL. 21, NO. 4
1986 IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 1025
verification requirements of the new law and can lawfully employ the alien
until September 1, 1987.
The INS's temporary rule for legalization applicants results from a
partial settlement in a class action challenging various aspects of the 1986
immigration reform laws. 6 5 This special procedure need only be followed
for legalization applicants hired after November 6, 1986. As noted above,
alien employees hired before the date of enactment are "grandfathered
in." No verification of those employees need be conducted.
66
Recordkeeping requirements. Agencies that refer or recruit but do not
hire must keep the completed verification form at least three years after
the date of the recruiting or referral. 67 For individuals who are hired, the
employer must retain the form for at least three years, or one year after
the employee is terminated, whichever is later.6 8 This could mean that an
employer will have to retain the verification form for decades, if the
employee decides to stay with the company his or her entire career.
How quickly employers must complete the 1-9 Form paperwork was a
source of controversy at the House-Senate conference. The conferees
eventually dropped a provision in the House bill that would have allowed
employers a twenty-four-hour grace period to show compliance. 69 In-
stead, the conferees directed the INS to issue regulations concerning this
issue that would address the practical problems confronting day laborers
and agricultural employers. 70 The conference report states that:
The employer shall be presumed to be in compliance with the paperwork and
verification requirements for the first twenty-four hours after the worker has
been hired to allow the worker time to produce the required documents under
this subsection. The Justice Department may rebut this presumption with evi-
dence that the employer has attempted to evade liability for employer sanctions
and responsibilities for verification through the employment of day hires.
7 1
The INS's preliminary working draft regulations followed the legislative
history on this point by giving a twenty-four-hour grace period for com-
pliance with the paperwork and verification requirements. 72 In response
to criticism by employers, however, the Service extended that time period
65. Catholic Social Services v. Meese, No. CIV-S-86-1434-LKK (E.D. Cal. March 23,
1987), reported in 64 Interpreter Releases 376-77, 437-38, 446-57 (1987). A notice containing
the terms of the settlement appears in 52 Fed. Reg. 11,567-75 (April 9, 1987).
66. See supra text accompanying note 61.
67. New INA § 274A(b)(3)(A); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,223 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.2(b)(2)(i)(B)).
68. New INA § 274A(b)(3)(B); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,223 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.2(b)(2)(i)(A)).
69. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 17, at 89.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Proposed 8 C.F.R. § 274a.3(e)(1), reprinted in 64 Interpreter Releases 97 (1987).
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in its final regulations to three business days in most cases. 73 An employer
who hires someone for less than three days must complete the 1-9 veri-
fication form before the end of the employee's first working day.74
Inspections. Form 1-9 must be produced for inspection within three
business days after being requested by an INS official. 75 No subpoena or
warrant is required. 76 Any refusal or delay in the presentation of each
Form 1-9 for inspection constitutes noncompliance with the law. 7 7
Copying verification documents. The new law permits copying and re-
tention of documents presented by applicants for verification purposes. 78
It may seem silly to include such a provision in a federal statute. However,
a provision of the U.S. Code makes it a criminal offense to copy certain
immigration documents, including certificates of naturalization and citi-
zenship, which are two of the documents that can be used to establish
identity and employment authorization. 79 This section overcomes that
prohibition, but only for verification purposes.
Employers, recruiters, and referrers are not obligated to keep copies
of the documentation presented to them by applicants. The advantages
of retaining copies of an applicant's documents are several: (1) it proves
that the employer, recruiter, or referrer examined the necessary docu-
ments and that they reasonably appeared on their face to be genuine; (2)
it shows a good faith intent to comply with the law; (3) it provides evidence
if an employee later claims an employer did not verify; and (4) it may
help to deter further inquiry by INS agents.
The disadvantages are: (1) the INS may question whether the documents
are genuine; (2) inconsistency in keeping copies could lead to charges of
discrimination; (3) it adds to the paperwork burden and cost of compli-
ance; and (4) the likelihood of being audited is small. On the whole,
however, cautious employers may prefer to keep copies of the documen-
tation.
Limits on the use of the verification form. The verification form and
any information on or attached to it may be used only to enforce the
INA and for prosecuting violations of 18 U.S.C. section 1001 (prohib-
iting false statements or concealment of material facts), section 1028
(prohibiting use or transfer of false identification documents), section
1546 (prohibiting fraud and misuse of immigration documents), and
73. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)).
74. Id. (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(iii)).
75. Id. at 16,223 (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2)(ii)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. New INA § 274A(b)(4); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,223 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.2(b)(3)).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1426 (1982); see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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section 1621 (prohibiting perjury). 80 Thus, for example, this information
generally would not be available to the Internal Revenue Service or
the Social Security Administration. The legislative history states that
the law is designed to ensure that the verification information will not
be used by the INS to apprehend and deport undocumented aliens. 81




Generally. The civil penalties for hiring, recruiting, referring, or con-
tinuing to employ an unauthorized alien are: first offense-$250-$2,000
per unauthorized alien, second offense-$2,000-$5,000 per unauthorized
alien, and third offense-$3,000-$10,000 per unauthorized alien. 83 An
employer, recruiter, or referrer who engages in "a pattern or practice"
of employment violations is subject to criminal penalties of up to $3,000
for each unauthorized alien and up to six months imprisonment. 84 An
injunction against "pattern or practice" violators is also possible. 85
An employer, recruiter, or referrer who fails to ask job applicants for
identification documents is subject to a civil penalty of $100-$1,000 for
each such applicant. 86 No criminal penalties attach to the paperwork
violations, however. 87 The paperwork penalties apply even if the applicant
is a U.S. citizen. 88
Effective dates. Technically, both the ban on knowingly employing,
recruiting, or referring an unauthorized alien and the new law's paperwork
requirements became effective on November 6, 1986, the date of the en-
actment. However, the law stated that penalties for violating these pro-
visions did not take effect until June 1, 1987.89 The interim six months
was strictly a public education period, and no sanctions can be imposed
for violations alleged to have occurred during that period. 90
80. New INA § 274A(b)(5); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,223 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.2(b)(4)).
81. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 61.
82. Id.
83. New INA § 274A(e)(4); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a. 10(b)(1)).
84. New INA § 274A(f)(1).
85. New INA § 274A(f)(2).
86. New INA § 274A(e)(5); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a. 10(b)(2)).
87. New INA § 274A(e)(5).
88. Id.
89. New INA § 274A(i)(1).
90. New INA § 274A(i)(1)(B).
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According to the statute, during the next twelve-month period between
June 1, 1987, and May 31, 1988, only a citation can be imposed for first
violations.9 1 The House Judiciary Committee report directs the INS to is-
sue a citation only if it has "persuasive" evidence that a violation has oc-
curred. 92 The INS is to issue guidelines, including specific examples, of
what constitutes persuasive evidence. 93 To date it has not done so. No ju-
dicial review of a citation is provided. 94 An employer, recruiter, or referrer
could be fined for a subsequent offense during this twelve-month period. 9 5
A similar citation period exists for the new law's paperwork require-
ments. 96 After the twelve-month warning period, the full penalty schedule
takes effect; no preliminary citations will be given.
Administrative delay in the effective date. Enforcement of employer
sanctions did not begin on June 1, 1987, as planned. The Service was
slow to educate businesses about their obligations. For example, it did
not even mail its handbook explaining the new law to all employers until
late June, and its public education and advertising campaign was minimal.
In response to these problems, Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) sponsored
an amendment to the fiscal year 1987 supplemental appropriations bill
that would have delayed the start of employer sanctions for four months,
until October 1, 1987. The Senate approved the measure, but the provision
was ultimately dropped in the House-Senate conference committee upon
assurances by the Service that it would not issue a warning citation against
an employer for failing to comply with the verification requirements until
after the business had first been contacted by a Service official to explain
the new law.97 INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson characterized the em-
ployer visits as the first part of a phased-in approach to enforcement of
employer sanctions.98 The informational visits are to continue through
June 1, 1988. As of the date this article was written, the INS had not
issued any citations.
Factors in determining penalty for paperwork violations. The statute
lists five factors to be considered in determining the amount of the civil
money penalty for paperwork violations: (1) the employer's size; (2)
whether the employer acted in good faith; (3) the seriousness of the vi-
olation; (4) whether or not the individual was an unauthorized alien; and
91. New INA § 274A(i)(2).
92. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 58.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 17, at 86.
96. See new INA § 274A(i)(2) (citation period for violations of new INA § 274A(a)).
§ 274A(a)(1)(B) includes the new law's paperwork requirements within the scope of § 274A(a).
97. 133 CONG. REC. H5680-81 (daily ed. June 27, 1987).
98. See 64 Interpreter Releases 875-76, 889-91 (1987).
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(5) the history of previous violations, if any.99 No similar factors are set
forth to aid in determining the size of money penalties for violations of
the ban on hiring, recruiting, or referring unauthorized aliens.
Counting the number of violations. The House Judiciary Committee
report states that "in counting the number of previous determinations of
violations for purposes of determining which penalty applies, determi-
nations of more than one violation in the course of a single proceeding
or adjudication are counted as a single determination." 100 Thus, for ex-
ample, if an employer is found in a first proceeding to have knowingly
hired four unauthorized aliens, the maximum penalty that can be imposed
against the same employer in the next adjudication is $5,000 per alien,
i.e., the maximum for a second violation.
Separate subdivisions. The Act provides that separate subdivisions shall
be considered separate employers, recruiters, or referrers for purposes
of the new law if they meet certain criteria. 101 The subdivisions must be
physically separate, and must do their own hiring and recruiting com-
pletely independently. 102 Each subdivision must not be "under the control
of or [in] common control with" another subdivision. 10 3
The paragraph about subdivisions lies in a subsection describing the
penalties only for hiring, recruiting, and referring violations. ' 04 The sub-
section describing penalties for paperwork violations fails to contain sim-
ilar language about separate subdivisions. 10 5 This raises the possibility
that the benefit intended for separate subdivisions may apply only for
hiring, recruiting, and referring violations, not for paperwork violations.
It seems doubtful that Congress intended this discrepancy. Fortunately,
the INS's implementing regulations appear to allow the separate subdi-
vision benefit for all violations. 106
Large corporations with multiple offices may want to consider decen-
tralizing their personnel functions as much as possible to minimize the
company's exposure to those sanctions. The following example from the
House Judiciary Committee report highlights the advantage of separate
subdivisions:
[Sluppose automaker A has two distinct subdivisions, X and Y. In 198[7),
subdivision X commits its second violation, i.e., it becomes liable under the
99. New INA § 274A(e)(5); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May I, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a. I0(b)(2)).
100. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 60.
101. New INA § 274A(e)(4).
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May I, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.I0(b)(3)).
104. New INA § 274A(e)(4).
105. New INA § 274A(e)(5).
106. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.I0(b)(3)).
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first civil fine provision. At that point, automaker A is jointly responsible with
X for such liability. In 198[7], subdivision Y commits its first violation (which
by definition, results in a citation only). At that point automaker A is, like Y,
responsible for that violation. However, insofar as A is concerned, the violation
by Y is A's first violation. That is to say, the violation by Y is not added to the
previous two violations by X to create third stage liability (i.e., a second level
civil fine) for automaker A. In short, the parent corporation can never be subject
to a level of offense that is higher than the highest level reached by any of its
independent subdivisions. 107
In addition, without the benefit of the separate subdivisions provision,
large corporations may suffer an increased risk of criminal liability, be-
cause the cumulative number of violations may more easily establish a
"pattern or practice" of violations.
"Pattern or practice." As noted above, a person or entity who engages
in a "pattern or practice" of hiring, recruiting, or referring undocumented
aliens can be jailed for up to six months and/or fined up to $3,000 per
unauthorized alien. 108 "Pattern or practice" is not defined in the new law
itself, but the legislative history makes clear that the phrase is to be
construed similarly to other statutes containing that phrase. 10 9 It is ex-
pected that courts will follow the judicial construction of the phrase as
set forth in such cases as International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 110 United States v. International Association ofironworkers Local
No. /,III and United States v. Mayton.112 These cases all indicate that
the term "pattern or practice" applies only to regular, repeated, and
intentional activities. 113 The Service's regulations adopt this test.
Injunctions. The Attorney General may seek an injunction in a U.S.
district court against a person or entity who he has "reasonable cause to
believe" is engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring, recruiting, or re-
ferring unauthorized aliens.' 14 The legislative history to this provision
states that injunctive relief is designed to improve the government's ability
to deal with repeat offenders. 115
107. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 60.
108. New INA § 274A(f)(I).
109. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 59; see, e.g., Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-1974; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2005; Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.
110. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
III. 438 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1971).
112. 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964).
113. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.(l)(k)) (definition of "pattern
on practice").
114. New INA § 274A(f)(2); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225-26 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.FR.
§ 274a. 10(c)).
115. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 59-60.
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As with the civil and criminal penalties described above, injunctions
are not available the first six months after enactment.' 16 Injunctions are
not provided for paperwork violations.
Compliance procedures. The legislation requires the INS to draft reg-
ulations establishing procedures for investigating and prosecuting em-
ployment, recruiting, and referring violations.117 The Act envisions that
individuals will be able to file complaints, which the INS must investigate
if they have "a substantial probability of validity." 118 The INS's regula-
tions generally follow the legislative framework on this point. 19 A new
INS unit is to be created specifically to investigate and prosecute alleged
employment violations. 1 20
Persons charged with violating the ban on hiring or recruiting or refer-
ring undocumented aliens will be provided with at least thirty-days' no-
tice, and an opportunity for a hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ). 121 Assuming an employer has a defense, he should always request
a hearing, because failure to do so will render the Service's final order
unappealable. 122 Assuming a hearing is requested, it must follow the pro-
cedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 23 This is
different from other hearings held under the INA, which do not have to
conform to the APA.124
The government must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence
in civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions. 125
The new law provides for administrative appellate review, as well as
judicial review by the relevant court of appeals. 126
E. PREEMPTION
The new law explicitly preempts state and local employer sanctions
law.127 At last count there were about thirteen of these, although many
116. Id. at 60.
117. New INA § 274A(e)(1).
118. New INA § 274A(e)(I)(B).
119. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9).
120. New INA § 274A(e)(1)(D).
121. New INA § 274A(e)(3)(A); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.9(c)(d)).
122. New INA § 274A(e)(3)(B); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.9(d)(2)).
123. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
124. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Schuck, The Transformation of Im-
migration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3034 (1984).
125. New INA § 274A(e)(3)(C).
126. New INA § 274A(e)(6), (7).
127. New INA § 274A(h)(2).
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have not been vigorously enforced. The legislative history notes that the
new federal law is:
not intended to preempt or prevent lawful state or local processes concerning
the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license to any person who
has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this legislation.
Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or "fitness to do
business laws," such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which
specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting
or referring undocumented aliens.128
F. INDEMNIFICATION
The new law expressly prohibits employers, recruiters, or referrers from
requiring a job applicant to indemnify them against any potential liability
for either paperwork or unlawful employment violations. 129 The penalty
for violating this indemnification ban is $1,000 for each violation.' 30 The
violator must also return the amount of the bond or security to the
individual. 131
As with the other employer sanctions, there was a six-month education
period until June 1, 1987, before this provision took effect. However,
there is no subsequent twelve-month first citation period.
Interestingly, the law does not prohibit a general contractor from re-
quiring indemnification bonds from subcontractors. Thus, although a gen-
eral contractor is liable if he knows a subcontractor is employing undo-
cumented aliens, the prime contractor can protect himself by requiring
the subcontractor to reimburse the prime for any civil penalties the prime
must pay. Such indemnification bonds may well become standard language
in future construction and other contracts.
G. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS
It is possible, but unlikely, that employer sanctions will end in 1989.
The legislation requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) to submit
to Congress and to a special task force three annual reports analyzing,
among other things, whether the sanctions provisions have created (1) an
unnecessary regulatory burden on employers and/or (2) a pattern of em-
ployment discrimination based on national origin.' 32 If the GAO finds
128. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 19, at 58.
129. New INA § 274A(g)(1).
130. New INA § 274A(g)(2).
131. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (May 1, 1987) (new 8 C.F.R. § 274a.8).
132. New INA § 274A(j)(l).
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such discrimination in any of its reports, the task force must then rec-
ommend corrective legislation to Congress. 133 The bill specifies that em-
ployer sanctions are to end if (1) the last GAO report states that a "wide-
spread pattern of discrimination" has resulted solely from employer
sanctions and (2) Congress enacts a joint resolution within thirty days of
that report concurring in the findings. 134 Congress is unlikely to adopt
such a resolution, both because of the problems inherent in finding a
"widespread" pattern of discrimination solely because of employer sanc-




Section 102 of the IRCA creates a new section 274B of the INA.
135
Section 274B prohibits discrimination in hiring and firing based on an
individual's national origin or citizenship status. The protected class of
people include U.S. citizens, nationals, lawful permanent resident aliens,
refugees, asylees, and newly legalized aliens who have filed a notice of
intent to become U.S. citizens. It does not protect aliens who are not
authorized to work. The law applies to employers, referrers, and recruiters
who employ three or more people, and prohibits discrimination both in
hiring and firing. Employers will not violate the antidiscrimination pro-
visions if federal, state, or local laws or contracts require them to use
U.S. citizens. Also, employers may choose a U.S. citizen over an alien
if both applicants are equally qualified.
The new law creates a special office in the Justice Department to in-
vestigate and prosecute charges of discrimination stemming from unlawful
immigration-related employment practices. A finding of discrimination
can result in a civil penalty of up to $2,000 for each individual discrimi-
nated against, as well as an order to rehire the individual(s), with or
without back pay.
The antidiscrimination provisions will end automatically if employer
sanctions are terminated. Even if employer sanctions continue, the an-
tidiscrimination provisions may end if Congress enacts a joint resolution
to terminate them.
133. New INA § 274A(k).
134. New INA § 274A(i).
135. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 102 (creating new INA § 274B).
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B. BACKGROUND
Generally. The antidiscrimination provisions complement the employer
sanctions provisions of the new law. Many minorities, especially Hispan-
ics and Asians, worried that employer sanctions might result in increased
national origin or alienage discrimination, and that enforcement of em-
ployer sanctions would not suffice to prevent such discrimination. 36 It
was also believed that current law, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. section 1981, was inadequate to protect against
such discrimination. For those reasons, Congress adopted the antidiscrim-
ination provisions in the IRCA. The provisions are also known as the
Frank amendment, after their primary sponsor, Representative Barney
Frank (D-MA).
Title VII limitations. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects
individuals from discrimination based on race, religion, color, sex, or
national origin. 137 In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 138 the Su-
preme Court held that Title VII's prohibition against national origin dis-
crimination does not bar discrimination based solely on alienage. National
origin refers to the country where a person was born, or from which his
or her ancestors came. Alienage refers to a person's status as a noncitizen.
An example of national origin discrimination is an employer's refusal to
hire any individuals of a particular national origin, such as Mexican-
Americans. An example of alienage discrimination is an employer's policy
to hire only U.S. citizens, thereby discriminating against all aliens, even
if alien applicants have authorization to work. Under Espinoza, as long
as the employer's citizenship requirement is not a pretext for actually
discriminating against one national group (e.g., Mexican-Americans), the
employer has not violated Title VII. For example, in Espinoza a Mexican-
American noncitizen was refused employment at a plant where 96 percent
of the employees were of Mexican ancestry.' 39 With those facts, the
plaintiff obviously could not show that the employer was discriminating
on the basis of national origin, i.e., against all Mexican-Americans.
A further problem with Title VII is the limited scope of its coverage.
Title VII covers only employers who employ fifteen or more employees. 140
It has been estimated that half of all employers may not be subject to
136. See generally Anti-Discrimination Provision of H.R. 3080: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 110-28 (1985) (statement of Rep. Robert Garcia (D-NY))
[hereinafter Joint Hearing].
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
138. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
139. Id. at 93.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1982).
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Title VII because they are too small. Moreover, only those employees
who work twenty or more calendar weeks each year are protected. 141
Thus, employers who only hire seasonal workers are exempted, even if
they employ hundreds of workers. Finally, Title VII permits several dis-
criminatory practices. For example, a statutory exception allows discrim-
ination on grounds of national origin where national origin characteristics
constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification" reasonably necessary
to the operation of the business. 142 Another exception allows the use of
practices that have a discriminatory effect as long as the practice has a
relationship to job performance or is supported by a business necessity. 143
42 U.S.C. section 1981 limitations. 42 U.S.C. section 1981 provides
that "[aIll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right ... to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens. . . ." 144 The section is intended to protect against private
discrimination, including employment discrimination, based on race. 145
At least one circuit court of appeals decision and a few district court
opinions have allowed a plaintiff to bring a claim of alienage discrimination
under section 1981.146 Other courts, however, have rejected that view. 147
Thus it is unclear whether section 1981 prohibits private discrimination
on the basis of alienage. Even if it does, certain practical problems limit
the usefulness of the section to provide a remedy for victimized aliens. 148
C. SCOPE OF SECTION
Scope of protection. The IRCA's antidiscrimination provisions prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of a person's "national origin"
or "citizenship status." 149 "Citizenship status" is not identical with "al-
ienage." The two terms are discussed in further detail below. "National
origin" is derived from Title VII. Thus the two statutes overlap to a certain
extent. However, as indicated above, Title VII protection applies only to
141. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1982); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
143. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264 (5th Circ. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
145. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
146. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corat, 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); Espinoza v.
Hillwood Square Mutual Ass'n, 522 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1981); Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co.,
433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ill. 1977); cf. St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 55 U.S.L.W. 4626
(U.S. May 18, 1987) (§ 1981 protects persons from intentional discrimination based on
ancestry or ethnicity).
147. See, e.g., De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp.
1121 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
148. See Joint Hearing, supra note 136, at 413-14.
149. New INA § 274B(a)(1).
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employers of fifteen or more employees, while the Frank amendment
applies to all employers of three or more employees.' 5 0 Thus the IRCA
extends civil rights protection for claims of national origin discrimination
to more employees, and creates new protection for claims of discrimi-
nation based on citizenship status.
An example of discrimination based on citizenship status is an em-
ployer's refusal to hire any applicant who fails to present a U.S. passport.
The verification provision in the employer sanctions portion of the Simpson-
Rodino Act provides numerous alternatives to a U.S. passport to establish
an applicant's work authorization and identity, and the law specifically
states that as long as the other documentation reasonably appears to be
genuine, the employer is not required to request further documentation,
such as a passport. 151 If an employer insists on requiring a passport, that
could be proof of discrimination in violation of the Frank amendment.
Hiring andfiring. Under the Frank amendment an employer may not
discriminate based on national origin or citizenship status in hiring or
firing an individual. 152 The law also prohibits such discrimination when
recruiting or referring an individual for a fee. 153
This scope of protection seems to be much narrower than under Title
VII, which extends beyond hiring and firing to prohibit discrimination
with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment."' 154 This difference between the IRCA and Title VII appears
to mean that employers of between four and fourteen people could, after
an individual is hired, lawfully treat that person less favorably than other
employees in promotional opportunities, raises, and other terms of em-
ployment, if the discrimination is based solely on the person's national
origin. Similarly, any employer of more than three workers may be able
to treat employees unfairly in the terms of their employment if the dis-
crimination is based on citizenship status. In certain circumstances, how-
ever, this kind of discrimination on the job could be considered a con-
structive discharge, and thus perhaps invoke the Frank amendment after
all. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes an employ-
ee's working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would
feel forced to resign.155
150. New INA § 274B(a)(2).
151. See new INA § 274A(b)(1), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 52-55.
152. New INA § 274B(a)(1).
153. Id. The language concerning recruiting or referring for a fee is identical to that used
in the employer sanctions section of the statute. For further discussion of the questions
concerning the scope of that language, see supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1982).
155. See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982); Clark
v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d
369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981).
VOL. 21, NO. 4
1986 IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 1037
Some aliens may claim that other facets of employment should be con-
sidered to fall within the ambit of section 274B. For example, disparities
in salary, working conditions, work rules, or benefits that exist at the time
of employment may constitute discrimination "with respect to . . .hir-
ing."' 156 On the other hand, Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-WY), one of the
prime authors of the 1986 legislation, has expressed the view that pro-
motion decisions are outside the purview of the Act.157
All this confusion about the scope of the Frank amendment's protection
will no doubt lead to much litigation.
Unlike employer sanctions, the antidiscrimination provisions have no
six-month grace period during which penalties cannot be imposed. 158 The
Frank amendment also contains a 180-day statute of limitations period. 159
The combination of these provisions poses possible problems for em-
ployers, and opportunities for employees. For example, suppose an
employer, fearful of employer sanctions, fired some of his long-time foreign-
looking employees on December 1, 1986, right after the new law was
enacted. The employer should not have done this, for two reasons. First,
the IRCA specifically exempts already hired employees from employer
sanctions or the verification provisions. Second, if the employer discrim-
inated in his firing decision on the basis of national origin or citizenship
status, he has violated the antidiscrimination provisions. With the six-
month statute of limitations, the fired employees could have filed discrim-
ination claims in spring 1987, even though employer sanction penalties
did not take effect until later. If successful, the fired employees might
have to be reinstated, perhaps with back pay. The employer might also
have to pay a fine of $1 ,000 for each employee unlawfully fired. The bottom
line: Employers should not panic and fire current employees simply be-
cause of the new law's employer sanctions provisions. Employees who
are unlawfully fired should be sure to preserve their rights by filing a
discrimination claim before the six-month statute of limitations expires.
Individuals protected. The categories of individuals protected under the
IRCA's antidiscrimination provisions vary with the type of discrimination
alleged. Any individual other than an unauthorized alien is protected from
national origin discrimination. 160 By contrast, only U.S. citizens, nation-
als, and "intending citizen[s]" qualify for protection from discrimination
based on citizenship status.16 1 Thus, an alien green cardholder, who is
156. New INA § 274B(a)(1).
157. See Joint Hearing, supra note 136, at 95.
158. Cf. new INA § 274A(i).
159. New INA § 274B(d)(3).
160. New INA § 274B(a)(1)(A).
161. New INA § 274B(a)(1)(B), (a)(3).
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not a U.S. citizen and does not intend to become one, could bring a charge
under the Act if he or she was discriminated against because of his or her
Mexican ancestry, but not if the discrimination was based on citizenship.
Under the INA a national of the United States includes "a person who,
though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to
the United States." 162 The status of national is the product of legislation
or other action by the federal government and cannot be created by a
mere assertion of allegiance. 163 The term has been applied primarily to
inhabitants of territories acquired by the United States. It now affects an
extremely limited number of persons, such as certain natives of insular
possessions.
An alien must satisfy three requirements to qualify as an intending
citizen. First, he or she must be a lawful permanent resident alien, newly
legalized alien, refugee, or asylee.164 Second, the alien must declare an
intent to become a citizen. 165 The existing INS Form N-315 used for this
purpose has fallen into disuse and is no longer available. Moreover, when
it was in use, it could only be executed by legal permanent resident aliens,
and only after they had filed, and the INS had approved, an "Application
to File Declaration of Intent" (Form N-300).
Third, the alien must complete INS Form N-400, the application for
naturalization. 166 This last requirement has strict time limits. All aliens
who became eligible to apply for naturalization before November 6, 1986,
the date of enactment, must have filed N-400 by May 5, 1987.167 Aliens
who become eligible to apply for naturalization after November 6 must
apply within six months of the date of eligibility.168 Failure to comply
with these time strictures will result in losing all possible protection under
the antidiscrimination provisions.
Unfortunately, these time limits are not very well-known. Lawyers
would perform a real service for many of their former and current alien
clients who are eligible for naturalization by contacting them and urging
them to file Form N-400 promptly.
The definitions of citizen and intending citizen exclude some aliens from
protection under the antidiscrimination provisions. Examples of such aliens
include: (1) lawful permanent resident aliens who fail or do not intend to
apply for naturalization within the six-month time limits; (2) aliens who
162. INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § I1I01(a)(22) (1982).
163. See 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 11.3b
(rev. ed. 1985).
164. New INA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(i).
165. New INA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(ii).
166. New INA § 274B(a)(3).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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have entered the U.S. on nonimmigrant visas; (3) aliens paroled into the
U.S.; and (4) aliens in the U.S on extended voluntary departure status. 169
The definition also excludes aliens who fail to obtain naturalization within
two years after applying, unless they can show diligent pursuit of the
application. 170 Potential ironies abound because of these limitations. For
example, an alien who has unlawfully resided in the U.S. since before
1982 may qualify for legalization and eventually for naturalization. If the
legalized alien applies for and obtains naturalization within the necessary
time limits, he or she will be protected by the new law's antidiscrimination
provisions. 17 1 By contrast, an alien lawfully in the U.S. on an H-I tem-
porary worker visa for the same period of time is excluded from protec-
tion. Because the lawful temporary worker is not a U.S. citizen, an employer
can discriminate against that alien based on citizenship without fear of
violating the new law. Litigation may be needed to resolve these and other
perceived inconsistencies in the statute's scope of coverage.
Exceptions. The Frank amendment contains five exceptions. First, sec-
tion 274B's prohibitions against discrimination do not apply to "unau-
thorized alien[s]."' 172 The term "authorized alien" is defined only in the
employer sanctions part of the law.173 The same definition will undoubt-
edly apply to section 274B.
As explained above,174 work authorization is a complex concept. For
example, undocumented aliens who certify their eligibility for and intent
to apply for legalization can receive temporary work permits through
September 1, 1987.175 Because of their interim work authorization, these
aliens should be able to invoke the protections of section 274B if they are
unlawfully discriminated against before their work permits expire.
A recent court decision confirms this view. In League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Pasadena Independent School District 76 four un-
documented alien school janitors were fired for using false social security
numbers. All four were eligible for legalization under section 245A of the
new law, 177 and each had been hired before November 6, 1986. The League
169. See Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 99th Cong., 1 st Sess. 127 (1985) (statement of Richard P. Fajardo, Acting Associate
Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
170. New INA § 274B(a)(3)(II).
171. New INA § 274B(a)(3)(B)(i).
172. New INA § 274B(a)(l).
173. New INA § 274A(h)(3), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 9-10.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
176. 4o. H-87-935 (S.D. Tex. April 14, 1987).
177. New INA § 245A generally allows undocumented aliens who have lived in the U.S.
since before January 1, 1982 to apply for legalization.
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of United Latin American Citizens sued on behalf of the four fired work-
ers. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and ordered the
janitors to be reinstated, holding that "[w]hen applied to those who are
qualified for legalization, and who intend to become citizens, a policy of
terminating undocumented aliens for no reason other than that they have
given employers a false social security number constitutes an unfair im-
migration-related employment practice under § 2741(a) of the Act."' 178
The decision greatly expands the number of aliens who can claim section
274B protection, and limits the applicability of the statute's exception for
unauthorized aliens.
The second exception to the Frank amendment exempts small employ-
ers, defined as entities employing fewer than four employees. 179 The third
exception permits an employer, recruiter or referrer to discriminate on
the basis of an individual's national origin if the discrimination is allowed
under section 703 of Title VII.i 80 That section permits a discriminatory
requirement that is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise." t8' Thus, for example, an employer can require applicants to take
an English language aptitude test, if he can establish that it is a bona fide
occupational qualification. 182 Interestingly, this exception only applies to
national origin discrimination, not to discrimination based on an individ-
ual's citizenship status.
The fourth exception allows an employer to discriminate based on cit-
izenship status if such discrimination is otherwise required to comply with
federal, state or local laws, regulations, or contracts.183 This exception
also applies if the Attorney General determines it "essential" that an
employer employ only U.S. citizens in order to be able to do business
with a federal, state, or local agency or department. 184 It will be interesting
to see whether employers, in an effort to protect themselves from having
to comply with the new law's antidiscrimination provisions, will attempt
to persuade more government agencies to require the use of only U.S.
citizens in government contracts.
178. Slip op. at 12.
179. New INA § 274B(a)(2)(A); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (Mar. 23, 1987) (proposed 28
C.F.R. § 44.200(b)(1)(i)).
180. New INA § 274B(a)(2)(B).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
182. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 17, at 88 ("nothing in this bill shall
prevent the use of language as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification").
183. New INA § 274B(a)(2)(C); see also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding
New York state citizenship requirement for its police forces). See generally Joint Hearing,
supra note 136, at 414-17.
184. New INA § 274B(a)(2)(C).
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The fifth statutory exception makes it lawful for a company or entity
to prefer to hire, recruit, or refer a U.S. citizen or national over an alien
"if the two individuals are equally qualified." 8 5 This exception was added
on the House floor by Representative Daniel E. Lungren (R-CA). Con-
gressman Lungren explained that when two applicants are equally qual-
ified, an employer should be given discretion "for whatever reason to
hire a citizen or national of the United States over another individual who
is an alien.'' 186
The Lungren exception is limited in several respects. First, the excep-
tion applies only to hiring, recruitment, or referral, not to firings. Thus,
an employer may not use this exception to discriminate unlawfully in
laying off or firing workers.
Second, the employer has the burden of proof to show that the exception
applies. The exception is structurally parallel to the bona fide occupational
qualification defense under Title VII. 187 It is well established that em-
ployers have the burden of establishing this defense. 188 Representative
Lungren recognized that '[an employer] would have to show [that the
citizen and alien applicants] were equally qualified."1 89
Third, the exception for equally qualified citizens requires employers
actually to compare individual job applicants and to make a good faith
determination that the two (or more) applicants are equally qualified based
on legitimate hiring criteria. The language of the exception expressly
provides that one individual may be preferred over another individual if
the two are equally qualified. 190 Throughout the House floor debate, the
scope of the exception was illustrated by examples of employers who
were actually confronted with two equally qualified candidates. 191 A post
hoc showing of equal qualifications, based on the performance of the
person hired, should not satisfy the requirements of the statute. An em-
ployer seeking to avail itself of this defense must demonstrate that it made
an actual comparison at the time of employment and that based on in-
formation available at that time, the citizen and noncitizen appeared to
be equally qualified based on valid criteria.
185. New INA § 274B(a)(4); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (Mar. 23, 1987) (proposed 28
C.F.R. § 44.200(b)(2)).
186. 132 CONG. REC. H9767 (daily ed. Oct 9, 1986).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
188. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
189. 132 CONG. REC. H9767 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
190. See new INA § 274B(a)(4).
191. See 132 CONG. REC. H9767 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (Rep. Lungren: "if you have as
an employer a citizen and noncitizen in front of you, equally qualified, and you are trying
to make a decision"); id. at H9768 (Rep. Frank: "an employer who is faced with people of
equal qualifications").
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The criteria used for determining the qualifications of job applicants
are also subject to scrutiny. The measure of whether competing individuals
are "equally qualified" should be based on factors that are actually nec-
essary to proper performance of the job and demonstrably job-related.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued
a policy statement warning employers about the Lungren exception and
other aspects of the Simpson-Rodino Act.192 The policy statement notes
that while the IRCA lawfully permits an employer to prefer a citizen over
an authorized alien applicant who is equally qualified, such a preference
may still violate Title VII if it has the purpose or effect of discriminating
on the basis of national origin. 193 The EEOC statement also cites a number
of hiring practices that might violate Title VII if used by employers in a
misguided attempt to avoid the possibility of a fine or jail term under the
employer sanctions provisions of the immigration law. These include hir-
ing restrictions based on national background, citizenship, English fluency,
foreign accent, aptitude tests, and height or weight, all of which are illegal
if they hurt persons of a particular national origin and are not shown to
be job-related. 194
Separate subdivisions. The Frank amendment contains the same lan-
guage concerning treatment of separate subdivisions as does the employer
sanctions section of the statute. 195 For both sections, physically separate
subdivisions can be considered separate employers, recruiters, or refer-
rers if they meet certain criteria. The subdivisions must be physically
separate and must do their own hiring, recruiting, and firing. 196 Each
subdivision must not be under the control of or in common control with
another subdivision. 197
The same incentive for large employers to decentralize their personnel
functions to reduce penalty levels under the employer sanction provisions
exists under the Frank amendment. 198 A first violation of the antidiscrimi-
nation provisions could result in a civil fine of up to $1,000 and back pay
for each individual discriminated against. 199 Subsequent violations could
result in the same back pay award and a civil fine of up to $2,000 per
192. EEOC Policy Statement: "Relationship of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986" (Feb. 26, 1987), reported and reproduced in
64 Interpreter Releases 383, 400-03 (1987) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement].
193. EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 192, at 4.
194. Id. at 2-4.
195. Cf. new INA § 274B(g)(2)(D) with new INA § 274A(e)(4). For a discussion of
§ 274A(e)(4), see supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
196. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(D); new INA § 274A(e)(4).
197. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(D); new INA § 274A(e)(4).
198. See generally supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
199. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iii), § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I).
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individual.20 0 If a company's personnel operations are unified, this could
increase its exposure for multiple violations and result in higher fines.
Statute of limitations. The IRCA imposes a 180-day statute of limita-
tions for filing an immigration-related employment discrimination claim
with the Office of the Special Counsel. 20 The Department of Justice did
not name an Acting Special Counsel until April 21, 1987.202 Thus, indi-
viduals who were victims of national origin or citizenship discrimination
right after the law was enacted had little time to file their claims without
running afoul of the statute of limitations.
The Justice Department's proposed antidiscrimination regulations fail
to specify whether waiting more than 180 days to file a claim of immigration-
related employment discrimination will absolutely extinguish all rights
under the Frank amendment. 20 3 Under Title VII, a person who fails to
file a charge of discrimination within the stated time limits is ordinarily
estopped from maintaining a cause of action, but this is considered a
flexible standard and can be extended for equitable reasons. 20 4 The pro-
posed antidiscrimination regulations simply declare that a section 274B
claim received more than 180 days after the alleged discrimination oc-
curred shall be dismissed "with prejudice." 205
Compliance. An employer, recruiter, or referrer can comply with the
antidiscrimination provisions by keeping careful and complete records of
all job applicants, even if they are rejected, and of all terminations. In
this way the employer, recruiter, or referrer can document that he is not
discriminating against Hispanics, other minority groups or aliens in his
hiring or firing decisions. Because the Frank amendment became effective
immediately upon enactment, this recordkeeping policy should be insti-
tuted immediately.
D. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Generally. The statute sets forth only a skeletal outline of the practices
and procedures for bringing, defending, appealing and enforcing
immigration-related employment discrimination claims. The Justice De-
partment's proposed implementing regulations generally add little to the
statutory framework.
200. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iii), § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I1).
201. New INA § 274B(d)(3).
202. 64 Interpreter Releases 490-91 (1987); cf. New Immigration Law Mandates Justice
to Create Counsel's Office It Didn't Want, Legal Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at 2, col. 1 [hereinafter
Legal Times article] (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights, that the Special Counsel's office would be in operation in late Spring 1987).
203. See generally 52 Fed. Reg. 9274-9280 (March 23, 1987). The proposed antidiscrimina-
tion regulations are analyzed and reproduced in 64 Interpreter Releases 377-80, 392-98 (1987).
204. See Zipes v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
205. 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.301(d)).
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The statute establishes the following structure. An individual alleging
citizenship or national origin discrimination may file a complaint with the
Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices
within the Department of Justice. 20 6 The Special Counsel has 120 days
to decide whether there is "reasonable cause to believe" the charge is
true and whether to request a hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ). 20 7 If the Special Counsel declines to prosecute the matter, a private
right of action is also possible. 208
If after a hearing the ALJ finds a violation, he or she shall issue a cease
and desist order.209 The ALJ may also require the employer, recruiter, or
referrer to hire the affected individuals, with or without back pay and/or
to pay a fine of up to $1,000 per individual discriminated against. 210 Ju-
dicial review is possible in the relevant court of appeals. 211
Who may bring a charge. Any person "adversely affected directly" by
an unfair immigration-related employment practice may file a charge with
the Special Counsel. 212 The proposed implementing regulations fail to
define "adversely affected." 213 Another person may also file a complaint
on behalf of the discriminatee. 214 Presumably this will allow a union to
file a charge on behalf of its members. An INS officer may also file a
charge. 215 Finally, the Special Counsel may conduct an investigation on
his own initiative and file a complaint before an ALJ. 2 16
Investigation of charges. The Special Counsel has 120 days to determine
whether there is "reasonable cause to believe" that the charge of an
unfair immigration-related employment practice is true. 217 The Special
Counsel may have problems complying with this time limit. For example,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which inves-
206. New INA § 274B(b)(1); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28
C.F.R. § 44.300(c)).
207. New INA § 274B(d)(1); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28
C.F.R. § 44.303).
208. New INA § 274B(d)(2).
209. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(A); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9279 (March 23, 1987) (proposed
28 C.F.R. § 44.308).
210. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(B).
211. New INA § 274B(i).
212. New INA § 274B(b)(l). A proposed optional form to provide the Special Counsel
with the information necessary to investigate the discrimination claim is reproduced in 52
Fed. Reg. 9280 (March 23, 1987).
213. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.300(a)).
214. New INA § 274B(b)(l).
215. Id.
216. New INA § 274B(d)(1); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278-79 (March 23, 1987) (proposed
28 C.F.R. § 44.304).
217. New INA § 274B(d)(l); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28
C.F.R. § 44.303). The proposed regulations fail to define "reasonable cause to believe."
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tigates Title VII claims, has been in existence for over twenty years and
has numerous field offices, over 3,000 personnel, and an annual budget
of over $163 million. 218 By contrast, the Justice Department is budgeting
only $4.2 million and sixty positions for the Special Counsel's staff for
immigration-related discrimination cases. 2 19 Yet despite its relative wealth
of resources, the EEOC has been plagued with backlogs of almost 100,000
cases. This has resulted in the EEOC missing statutory deadlines. Such
omissions have not been held to affect jurisdiction in subsequent litigation
proceedings, however. 220 It is to be hoped that similar failure by the
Special Counsel to meet the deadline imposed by the IRCA will also not
result in dismissal of a case.
If the Special Counsel fails to file a complaint before an AU within 120
days, the persons making the charge may file a private action directly
with an ALJ.22 1 However, to qualify for a private right of action, the
charge must allege "knowing and intentional discriminatory activity or a
pattern or practice of discriminatory activity." 222 Whether this require-
ment is a subset of all citizenship and national origin discrimination charges,
or effectively defines the universe of discrimination charges that may be
brought under the Frank amendment, is a major point of controversy. The
issue is discussed more fully below.
The statute sets no limitation on the length of time a complainant has
to file a private action. The Justice Department's proposed implementing
regulations would limit plaintiffs to ninety days from the end of the 120-
day investigatory period to bring an action directly.223 The Justice De-
partment justifies this ninety-day limitation as "reasonable . . .to avoid
the filing of stale complaints." 224 While it may be reasonable, the statute
contains no such time constraint. A reviewing court might consider the
proposed rule ultra vires on this point.
Another more practical reason exists for challenging the ninety-day
limit. The rule assumes that the Office of the Special Counsel will have
completed its investigation of the alleged discriminatory activity within
120 days. Yet if the experience of the new Special Counsel is anything
like that of the EEOC, unfair immigration-related discrimination inves-
tigations could take much longer. According to Title VII experts, EEOC
investigations often drag on for more than six months. If the Special
218. Joint Hearing, supra note 136, at 16, 23.
219. See 64 Interpreter Releases 29 (1987).
220. See, e.g., Cromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); Washington v.
TG&Y Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. La. 1971).
221. New INA § 274B(d)(2).
222. Id.
223. 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.303(c)).
224. 52 Fed. Reg. 9276 (March 23, 1987).
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Counsel's office takes anywhere near that long to investigate section 274B
discrimination claims, and if the proposed regulations are finalized without
change, many plaintiffs would have to file a private action directly with
an ALJ before the Special Counsel has completed its investigation, just
to preserve their private right of action. A better rule would allow plaintiffs
to file a private action with an ALJ within ninety days after the Special
Counsel has finished its investigation.
Proving discrimination. The statute is essentially silent on how to prove
discrimination under section 274B. Most commentators have assumed that
the test would be the same as that in Title VII cases. 2 25 A Title VII
complainant must prove either "disparate treatment" or "disparate im-
pact." "Disparate treatment" requires proof of an intent or a pattern or
practice of discriminating against individuals on the basis of their race,
religion, color, sex, or national origin. 226 In a "disparate impact" case,
the plaintiff alleges that a facially neutral test or employment criterion
that disproportionately disqualifies a protected class from employment is
not job related. Proof of discriminatory intent is not required in such
cases. 227 For example, consider a redheaded employer who hires only
redheads. He has a benign intent: he does not intend to discriminate
against anyone, he merely prefers redheads. That facially neutral em-
ployment criterion, however, has a disparate and adverse impact on mi-
norities. No blacks, Hispanics, or Orientals are likely to be hired (unless
they dye their hair red). Such a hiring standard would violate Title VII.
President Reagan's statement accompanying his signing of the bill re-
jects use of the "disparate impact" theory or recovery in the new im-
migration law. According to the President, section 274B requires proof
that the defendant intended to discriminate against the complainant be-
cause of his national origin or citizenship status:
[A] facially neutral employee selection practice that is employed without dis-
criminatory intent will be permissible under the provisions of section 274B. For
example, the section does not preclude a requirement of English language skill
or a minimum score on an aptitude test even if the employer cannot show a
"manifest relationship" to the job in question or that the requirement is a "bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise," so long as the practice is not a guise
225. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service, Comparison of the Unfair Immigration-
Related Employment Practice Provisions of the Immigration Control and Legalization
Amendments Act of 1985 (H.R. 3080) with the Frank Amendment, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the National Labor Relations Act 3 (1985) [hereinafter CRS Study].
226. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1(1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
227. See e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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used to discriminate on account of national origin or citizenship status. Indeed,
unless the plaintiff presents evidence that the employer has intentionally dis-
criminated on proscribed grounds, the employer need not offer any explanation
for his employee selection procedures. 228
As authority for his view, the President relied in part on the portion of
the statute allowing private rights of actions only for discrimination claims
alleging "knowing and intentional" discrimination or a "pattern or prac-
tice" of such discrimination. 229 The President would have this intent test
applied to all discrimination claims brought under section 274B, not just
private actions.
The Justice Department's proposed implementing regulations adopt the
President's intent test. 230 To constitute a violation of the antidiscrimi-
nation provisions, a person would always have to prove "knowing and
intentional" discrimination. 23 1 According to the supplementary infor-
mation part of the proposed rule, "[u]nder this standard it is not sufficient
to allege that a pattern or practice of activity results in discriminatory
effects." 232 Thus, the redheaded employer with the benign intent dis-
cussed above would not be found to violate section 274B, despite the
discriminatory effects created by his employment practice. The proposed
rule does acknowledge that discriminatory intent may be shown by cir-
cumstantial as well as by direct evidence, and that "statistics may be
used in appropriate cases to aid in proving discriminatory intent." 2 33
Representative Frank, the primary author of the antidiscrimination pro-
visions, disputes the administration's characterization of the appropriate
standard of proof.2 3 4 He contends that Congress intended to require an
intent element only for private actions. Representative Frank has sub-
228. President's Statement on Signing S.1200 Into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1534, 1535 (Nov. 6, 1986), reprinted in 63 Interpreter Releases 1036-39 (1986) [hereinafter
President's Statement]. For discussion of the proper significance to be attached to the
President's signing statement, see Garber & Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as
Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 363 (1987); Comment, Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's Interpretation
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination Provision: A Cir-
cumvention of Constitutionally Prescribed Legislative Procedure, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1057 (1987).
229. Id.
230. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9275, 9277-78 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.200(a)).
231. Id.
232. 52 Fed. Reg. 9275 (March 23, 1987).
233. Id.
234. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 1; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 17, 1986) (statement of Rep. Frank). The December 17 hearing, at
which Rep. Frank and a Justice Department official almost got into a shouting match over
the intent issue, is summarized in 63 Interpreter Releases 1180-83 (1986).
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mitted for the record various documents that he believes disprove the
administration's view of the relevant legislative history.235
A 1985 Congressional Research Service study of the Frank amendment
also supports Representative Frank's interpretation. The study noted that
about two-thirds of all analogous labor actions brought under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are found to lack merit. 236 Moreover, even
though a person may file an administrative appeal of a labor dismissal,
only about four percent of dismissals are reversed. 237 It may well be that
Congress, aware of these statistics, decided to permit private actions only
when intentional discrimination or a pattern or practice of discrimination
is alleged.
Litigation seems necessary to resolve this issue. In the meantime, the
administration's interpretation significantly narrows the scope of protec-
tion the Frank amendment provides.
Overlapping Title VII and immigration discrimination claims. Because
both Title VII and the Frank amendment prohibit discrimination based
on national origin grounds, the potential exists for two claims involving
the same set of facts to be filed, one with the Special Counsel, and the
other with the EEOC. The IRCA eliminates this possibility by generally
prohibiting dual filings of discrimination charges based on the same set
of facts. 238 An exception exists if a charge filed with one agency is dis-
missed as being outside the scope of that agency's jurisdiction. 239 This
exception can be important. Suppose, for example, that a U.S. citizen of
Hispanic origin files an action with the EEOC based on national origin
discrimination, only to learn later that the employer does not fall within
Title VII's jurisdictional guidelines (e.g., did not employ fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of at least twenty calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year). In that case, the exception to
the dual filing bar will allow the citizen to refile the charge under section
274B.
Counting the number of employees. As stated above, 240 Title VII ap-
plied only to employers who have fifteen or more employees "for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks." 24 1 Section 274B
235. A copy of the materials Representative Frank submitted is on file with the authors.
236. CRS Study, supra note 225, at 6 (citing Hearing on National Labor Relations Board
Case Backlog Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1983)).
237. Id.
238. New INA § 274B(b)(2). However, the Act does not bar a person from simultaneously
bringing an administrative claim of unfair immigration-related employment practices and a
complaint in federal court under a § 1981 theory.
239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
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contains no such language. In the case of national origin discrimination,
it applies to all employers with between four and fourteen employees; for
citizenship discrimination, it applies to all employers of more than three
employees. The Justice Department's proposed rule to implement section
274B resolves the difference between the two statutes in two ways. First,
the supplementary information part of the rule states that the Justice
Department will not use the twenty-calendar-week requirement of Title
VII for purposes of determining coverage under section 274B. 242 Second,
the Department would count all part-time and full-time employees work-
ing on the day the alleged immigration-related employment discrimination
occurred. 243
Hearings. The statute requires a defendant to be given notice and an
opportunity for a hearing before an ALJ. 2 4 4 The person who filed the
original charge with the Special Counsel is a full party to the proceedings,
and may testify at the hearing. 245 The employer/defendant must be given
at least five days' notice of the hearing. The employer has a right to file
a written answer to the discrimination complaint. 246 The hearing must be
transcribed, and the AU must issue a written decision based on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 247 The AU has authority to issue subpoenas
to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence. 248
The Justice Department's proposed implementing regulations generally
mirror the statutory language. 249 In one good point, the proposed rule
would mandate that all hearings before an AL be conducted pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 250 The statute itself does not
explicitly require APA procedures to be followed.
Penalties. The Special Counsel or the plaintiff must show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant has engaged in an unfair
immigration-related employment practice. 251 If this burden is met, the
AU must enter a cease and desist order.252 The order may also require
a first time offender to hire individuals discriminated against, with or
without back pay, and/or to pay a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per indi-
242. 52 Fed. Reg. 9275 (March 23, 1987).
243. Id.
244. New INA § 274B(e)(1).
245. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2. at 13 (1986).
246. New INA § 274B(e)(1).
247. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(A).
248. New INA § 274B(f)(2).
249. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9279 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.306).
250. Id. (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.306(f)).
251. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(A).
252. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9279 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.308).
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vidual. 253 The civil fine increases for subsequent violations up to a max-
imum of $2,000 per individual. 254
The back pay liability is limited to two years prior to the date of filing
the charge with an ALJ. 255 Also, interim wages earned by the individual
will reduce the amount of allowable back pay.256 Finally, the statute spec-
ifies that an ALJ cannot require back pay and/or the hiring of an individual
if the person was refused employment on legitimate grounds as well as
because of national origin or citizenship discrimination.
257
Judicial review. A party has sixty days to appeal an ALJ's final order
in a discrimination case. 258 Appeal is to the U.S. court of appeals in which
the employer resides or transacts business, or in which the violation
allegedly occurred. 259 This sixty-day time limit is fifteen more days than
the period for filing an appeal concerning an employer sanctions or pa-
perwork verification violation. 260
Enforcing ALJ orders. An ALJ's finding of employment discrimination
under section 274B is not self-enforcing. If a defendant fails to comply
voluntarily with an ALJ's order, the Special Counsel or the complainant
must petition the U.S. district court for enforcement. 26' The ALJ's order
is not subject to review in an enforcement proceeding. 262
The lack of self-execution may hinder speedy attainment of the relief
sought. Labor cases brought before administrative authorities under the
National Labor Relations Act are also not self-enforcing, and full litigation
of such matters has often been quite lengthy. 263
Attorney's fees. The statute specifically grants an ALJ or court of ap-
peals discretion to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" 264 to the prevailing
party (other than the United States) if the losing party's argument is
"without reasonable foundation in law and fact." 265 This provision should
provide an incentive to attorneys to accept immigration-related employ-
ment discrimination cases on behalf of individuals alleging discrimination.
A word of caution is in order, however. Individuals should be careful to
253. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iii), (iv)(I).
254. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
255. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(C); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9280 (March 23, 1987) (proposed
28 C.F.R. § 44.308(c)).
256. New INA § 274B(g)(2)(C).
257. Id.
258. New INA § 274B(i)(1).
259. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9280 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.310).
260. Cf. new INA § 274A(e)(7).
261. New INA § 274B(j)(1).
262. New INA § 274B(j)(2).
263. See CRS Study, supra note 225, at 5.
264. New INA § 274B(h), (j)(4).
265. Id.; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9280 (March 23, 1987) (proposed 28 C.F.R. § 44.309).
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file only those discrimination cases under section 274B that they believe
have a reasonable foundation. For example, about two-thirds of all charges
in National Labor Relations Board cases are found to be without merit. 266
As the President's statement makes clear, an alleged victim who loses his
or her section 274B discrimination case may have to pay the employer's
attorney's fees if it is determined that the victim's charge failed to have
a reasonable foundation in both law and fact. 267 Claimants should be
particularly cautious about proceeding with a private action if the Special
Counsel's office has determined through its initial 120-day investigation
that no "reasonable cause" exists to believe that the charge is true. 268
Section 274B's language concerning attorney's fees contrasts with the
standard established under Title VII. A prevailing Title VII plaintiff is
presumptively entitled to attorney's fees, while prevailing defendants are
entitled to fees only where the plaintiff's case was frivolous, unreasonable
or groundless, or brought or continued in bad faith. 269 This dual standard
evidences congressional desire to encourage Title VII plaintiffs to pursue
claims without the fear of an adverse fee award.
The role of the Justice Department. The Justice Department's proposed
implementing regulations provide a litmus test for determining whether
the antidiscrimination provisions of the new law will provide a viable
remedy for victims of national origin or citizenship discrimination. The
Justice Department opposed the Frank amendment before the law's en-
actment, 270 and the President's statement exhibits particular hostility to-
ward that section. 271 The proposed regulations generally construe the
section narrowly. A question also exists whether the Department of Jus-
tice will enforce the antidiscrimination provisions vigorously. Assistant
Attorney General Reynolds insists that the Department will be "fully
responsible" in its enforcement of the Frank amendment. 272 Civil rights
advocates say they will force the Department of Justice to be responsive
if necessary. 273
266. CRS Study, supra note 225, at 6.
267. President's Statement, supra note 228, at 2.
268. See new INA § 274B(d)(l); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9278 (March 23, 1987) (proposed
8 C.F.R. § 44.303(b)).
269. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
270. See, e.g., Joint Hearing, supra note 136, at 184 (statement of Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reynolds).
271. See text accompanying supra notes 228-29.
272. Legal Times article, supra note 202, at col. 3.
273. Id.
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E. GAO REPORTS AND TERMINATION OF THE FRANK AMENDMENT
The same three annual GAO reports required under the new law for
employer sanctions purposes 274 will also analyze whether employer sanc-
tions have resulted in a pattern of national origin discrimination against
"other than unauthorized aliens," or in a pattern of discrimination against
U.S. citizens, national, or "eligible workers seeking employment." 275 It
is important to note that the GAO's reporting duty applies to discrimi-
nation against any aliens authorized to work, whether or not they are
protected by the Frank amendment. Any evidence of discrimination against
noncitizens who are entitled to work in the United States, whether the
discrimination is on the basis of national origin or alienage, and whether
that discrimination is prohibited by Title VII, the IRCA, other state or
federal law, or by no law at all, is relevant to the GAO's reporting obli-
gation and should be collected and reported to the GAO.
Congress has established two separate means by which the antidism-
ination provisions might terminate. First, if employer sanctions are repealed
by a congressional joint resolution, the antidiscrimination provisions will
also expire. 276 Second, even if employer sanctions continue, the provi-
sions against national origin and citizenship discrimination end if the last
of the three annual GAO reports finds (a) that no significant employment
discrimination has occurred because of employer sanctions or (b) that
employer sanctions have created an unreasonable burden on employers,
and if Congress then enacts ajoint resolution within thirty days approving
the GAO's findings. 277 Given the political volatility of this issue, Congress
is unlikely to adopt such a resolution, even if the GAO report finds no
significant discrimination.
III. Conclusion
The IRCA creates an unavoidable tension for employers. On the one
hand, they can now be penalized for knowingly hiring unauthorized work-
ers. On the other hand, they can be penalized if they fire or refuse to hire
authorized aliens or foreign-looking citizens. Careful verification and re-
tention of the verification documents are key ingredients in establishing
compliance with both the employer sanctions and antidiscrimination pro-
visions of the new law.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
275. New INA § 274B(j)(2), (j)(1)(B).
276. New INA § 274B(k)(l).
277. New INA § 274B(k)(2).
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Employers should exercise caution before changing their personnel
practices. Mass layoffs of foreign-looking employees by an employer in
a mistaken effort to attempt to comply with the ban on employing un-
authorized workers might subject the employer to penalties for violating
Title VII and/or the Frank amendment. Employers should not panic.
In the long run, as a practical matter employers may need to worry
more about complying with the antidiscrimination provisions than with
the employer sanctions and paperwork requirements. The INS has limited
enforcement capabilities, even with the increased funding authorized by
Congress in the 1986 Act. For example, the Service currently has just
forty-five agents assigned to the seven-county area surrounding Los An-
geles, down from 130 in 1979.278 Similarly, the number of investigative
agents in the New York INS office has dropped from 240 in 1981 to 82
today.279 Few experts expect INS investigations or verification checks to
be very frequent or rigorous. 280 By contrast, the potential for a private
right of action, combined with attorney's fees, may help ensure that the
antidiscrimination provisions are enforced. Much will depend, however,
on how the Justice Department actually implements its regulations.
278. Few Employers Fear New Immigration Law, Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1986, at A3,
col. I.
279. At INS Office, Change in Focus Breeds Dissension, Newsday, Feb. 24, 1987, at 9.
280. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 6 (INS statement that its initial
enforcement activities will focus on large employers, companies with a history of hiring
undocumented aliens and those with a history of wage and hour violations).
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